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ABSTRACT
The European Commission's Statement of
Objections forms the latest addition to the
ongoing debate on the possible misuse of Google's
position in the search engine market. The
scholarly debate, however, has largely been over
the exclusionary effects of search degradation.
Less attention has been dedicated to the
dimension of quality - whether and how a search
engine, faced with rivals, could degrade quality
on the free side. We set out to address this
fundamental question: with the proliferation of
numerous web search engines and their free
usage and availability, could any search engine
degrade quality? We begin our analysis with a
review of the network effects that may impact
the relative power of a search engine. We next
identify three necessary, but not sufficient,
variables for quality degradation to occur in
search results. With these three variables in
mind, we consider instances when a search
engine could degrade quality despite competition
from rivals.
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INTRODUCTION
The exponential growth of the Internet has seen a
proliferation of email platforms, social networks,1 texting,
mapping, video sharing, gaming, and online communications,
many of which are provided free of charge. 2 Many platforms
bring together both consumers attracted to the platforms'
often-free services and advertisers seeking to target these
consumers. The common business model in these multi-sided
markets involves utilizing one's customer base to generate
revenue. Despite offering consumers a free product or service,
these firms can earn income by selling advertisers access to
these consumers' behaviors.
1 Examples of social networks include Linkedln, Facebook, and Academia.
2 See Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 7217-Facebook/WhatsApp (Oct. 3,
2014) (C 7239) 24-25, 47 (noting that the "vast majority of social
networking services are provided free of monetary charges").
2
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By and large, when a product or service is offered for free,
the primary dimension of competition is quality. 3 A competitive
market is therefore likely to stimulate investment in quality.
But when a firm earns its profits from one side of the market,
its conception of quality may be distorted. The firm may have
an incentive to degrade quality on the free side of the market
below levels that consumers prefer, if doing so increases its
profitability, or market power, among the paying participants.
Quality degradation exists in both paid and free multi-sided
markets. Newspapers, for example, compete vigorously but
skew their news coverage through self-censorship to avoid
offending an important category of advertisers. 4 Commercial
radio stations may disproportionately play certain songs in
exchange for payment from music companies. 5 Entertainment
producers can develop a show's storyline to highlight a
sponsor's product at the expense of artistic quality.6 In these
instances, the customer is more than just the recipient of a
product or service - the customer constitutes a commodity
traded to the other side of the market. When the product or
service is provided to customers free of charge, the focal point
shifts to the value gained on the other side of the market.
Consequently, if degrading the quality of the free product
maximizes profit on the other sides of the market, producers
may prioritize the latter. The extent to which quality may be
degraded depends on the level of competition and the ability of
consumers to identify and appraise changes in quality.
3 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 6281-Microsoft/Skype (Oct. 7, 2011)
(C 7279); European Commission Case No. COMP/M. 5727-
Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010) (C 1077); Office of Fair Trading,
Completed Acquisition by Motorola Mobility (Google, Inc.) of Waze
Mobile Ltd., ME/6167/13 at 28 (Dec. 17, 2013) (OFT considering
whether merger "may dampen Google's incentive to innovate and
improve quality as a result of the loss of an innovative rival").
4 Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Plurality of Political Opinion and
the Concentration of the Media, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIIITH
CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 571,
575-76 (Karen B. Brown & David V. Snyder eds., 2012).
5 After a series of scandals where music companies paid radio stations to
play certain songs, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission
promulgated "payola" rules where the broadcaster must disclose such
payments. See U.S. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, The FCC's Payola Rules,
CONSUMER GUIDE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/guides/payola-rules
[https://perma.cc/FCT5-BKNN].
6 See Michael Kmet, 'Breaking Bad' Product Placement and "Quality"
Television, MEDIASCAPE (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.tft.ucla.edu
/mediascape'/blog/?p=2036 [http://perma.cc/DSZ9-DHWG].
3
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In this paper we explore the interface between competition
and quality in the two-sided market of online search engines.7
Competition officials long ago rejected the canard that because
a product is free, it is somehow outside the competition laws.8
Although the product or service is free, the platforms still
compete to attract users, collect their personal data, and target
them with behavioral ads. As officials from the European
Commission stated in 2015:
In two-sided markets, where products are offered
to users for free and monetised through targeted
advertising, personal data can be viewed as the
currency paid by the user in return for receiving
the 'free' product, or as a dimension of product
quality. Hence, a website that, post-merger,
would start requiring more personal data from
users or supplying such data to third parties as a
condition for delivering its 'free' product could be
seen as either increasing its price or as
degrading the quality of its product.9
We explore elsewhere how and why quality forms a
fundamental aspect of competition. 10 Competition agencies
acknowledge that quality is a "key non-price consideration that
determines whether consumers will purchase a product."11
That significance was echoed by competition agencies that took
part in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)'s 2013 roundtable on the role and
measurement of quality. 12 Participating jurisdictions agreed
that quality competition drives innovation and economic
growth and that a decrease in quality can be just as harmful to
7 We discuss the relationship between competition and quality in Ariel
Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The Curious Case of Competition and
Quality, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 227 (2015).
8 See, e.g., Office of Fair Trading, Completed Acquisition by Motorola
Mobility (Google, Inc.) of Waze Mobile Ltd., ME/6167/13, at 7-8 (Dec.
17, 2013).
9 Eleonora Ocello, Cristina Sjodin & Anatoly Subocs, What's Up with
Merger Control in the Digital Sector? Lessons from the
Facebook/WhatsApp EUMerger Case, 2015 COMPETITION MERGER BRIEF
2,6.
10 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 7, at 2-8.
11 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., The Role and Measurement of
Quality in Competition Analysis, DAF/COMP(2013), at 5 (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/competition
/Quality-in-comp etition-analysis -2013.p df [https://perma.cc/TDY4-3CGB]
[hereinafter OECD Quality Report].
12 Id.
4
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consumers (if not more harmful, given health and safety
concerns) as a price increase. 13
Competition authorities cannot ignore quality - often the
primary parameter of competition when the service is free. The
competition between search engines, which have evolved to
become the gateways and guides that link users to relevant
websites, 14 focuses on quality. Quality competition among
search engines includes their capacity to quickly deliver the
most relevant results in response to a search query. But, as we
discuss, the impact of other revenue-generating activities may
lead to distortion of that quality competition and inferior
results.
Authorities increasingly recognize the search degradation
phenomenon and its impact on competition. In April 2015, the
European Commission (EC) issued a Statement of Objections
concerning Google's systematic favoring of its comparison-
shopping services in its general search results. 15 This quality
degradation, the EC found, harmed rival comparison-shopping
services, consumers, and innovation. 16  The Commission
outlined its preliminary view that this practice amounts to an
abuse of a dominant position. In her statement on this case,
Commissioner Vestager noted:
[W]hen a consumer enters a shopping-related
query in Google's search engine, Google's
comparison shopping product is systematically
displayed prominently at the top of the search
results. This display is irrespective of whether it
is the most relevant response to the query. Thus,
Google's commercial product is not subject to the
13 Id.
14 Joannis Lianos & Evgenia Motchenkova, Market Dominance and Search
Quality in the Search Engine Market, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 419,
422 (2013) (discussing how search engines "act as 'information
gatekeepers': they not only provide information on what can be found on
the web (equivalent to yellow pages), but they also are 'an essential first-
point-of-call for anyone venturing onto the Internet' and how they differ
from other two-sided platforms, as "search engines detain an important
amount of information about their customers and advertisers (the 'map
of commerce')").
15 European Commission Press Release Memo/15/4781, Antitrust:
Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison
shopping service (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release MEMO-15-4781 en.htm [https://perma.cc/T7UM-3Z5U].
16 Id. ("Google's conduct has a negative impact on consumers and
innovation. It means that users do not necessarily see the most relevant
comparison shopping results in response to their queries, and that
incentives to innovate from rivals are lowered as they know that however
good their product, they will not benefit from the same prominence as
Google's product.").
5
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same algorithms as other comparison shopping
service .. .with the result that consumers may
not necessarily see the most relevant results in
response to their queries, and Google's
competitors may not get the commercial
opportunities that their innovations deserve. 17
The Commission's Statement of Objections formed the
latest addition to the ongoing debate on the possible misuse of
Google's market power in the search engine market. That
debate has focused on manipulation of search engine results,
the impact this may have on actual or potential competitors
operating downstream, and the effects on the competitive
process.18 Less attention has been attributed to the dimension
of quality - whether and how a search engine, faced with
rivals, could degrade quality on the free side. 19
In response to the Commission's concerns, Google stated
that, although its search engine "may be the most used ...
people can now find and access information in numerous
different ways - and allegations of harm, for consumers and
competitors, have proved to be wide of the mark."20 Asserting
that "people have more choice than ever before,"' 21 Google
identified "numerous other search engines such as Bing, Yahoo,
Quora, DuckDuckGo and a new wave of search assistants like
17 European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on
Antitrust Decisions Concerning Google, STATEMENT/15/4785 (Apr. 15,
2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release STATEMENT-15-
4785 en.htm [https://perma.cc/27YX-R3P6].
18 Andrea Amelio & Dimitrios Magos, Economic Background of the
Microsoft/Yahoo! Case, 2010 COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 51; U.S. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding
Google's Search Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-
0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/public statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.p
df [https://perma.cc/J7U9-KCMD]. For the EU Commission's proceedings,
which were initiated in November 2010, see 39740 Google Search,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef
/case details.cfm?proc code=1 39740 [https://perma.cc/24M4-P7L7].
19 Lianos & Motchenkova, supra note 14, at 424 n. 18, 425 (noting that most
of the existing literature focuses on the advertising side of search
engines, finding "a threat of reduction in the quality of search results, if
the search engine market is monopolized or dominated by a single firm"
and suggesting that their model be extended to "an oligopoly setting" as a
"natural step forward" since it "is a better description of the current
practice with several engines competing in the search market (such as
Google, Bing, and Yahoo, among others)").
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Apple's Siri and Microsoft's Cortana,"22 in addition to "a ton of
specialized services like Amazon, Idealo, Le Guide, Expedia or
eBay,"23 and "social sites like Facebook, Pinterest and
Twitter."24
We set out to address this fundamental issue: to what
extent will competition from smaller search engines prevent
larger search engines from degrading the quality of search
results (and vice versa)? With the proliferation of numerous
web search engines and their free usage and availability, can
any search engine afford to degrade quality? After all, Internet
browsers enable users to run their queries on different search
engines with access to a multitude of services, which are a click
away.
Our aim here is to provide competition authorities and
courts with an analytical framework for assessing whether a
firm can degrade quality even if it competes with rivals. We do
not address the distinct issue of whether and when the
competition authority should intervene. As our article explores,
there is no single panacea for quality degradation. The remedy
will depend on: (1) the particular behavior, such as whether the
search engine is simply degrading quality to maximize profits
or is doing so to illegally maintain or attain a monopoly or
leverage its dominance into another market; (2) the context of
the behavior, such as whether quality degradation is the theory
of anticompetitive harm by a proposed merger or by an
existing, dominant firm; and (3) prevailing market conditions,
such as the extent to which network effects and status quo bias
are enabling the quality degradation.
We begin our analysis with a review of positive feedback
loops and network effects in the search engine market. Part II
illustrates the interface between competition and quality and
outlines the market conditions that may support quality
degradation. Following this, we consider three variables
affecting quality degradation in search results. 25 The first
relates to a search engine provider's ability and incentive to
intentionally degrade quality on the free side of the market
(namely the search results) below levels that most users prefer.
This, in turn, depends on the degree of several network effects,
and the extent to which the search engine's business model
benefits from scale and scope. The second variable is




25 See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 7 (discussing how competition
authorities have struggled to identify the dimensions of quality
competition important to many consumers).
7
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differences. The third variable is the cost of conveying to
consumers search engines' inherent quality differences and the
costs of switching to a competing service. With these three
variables in mind, we consider why a search engine would
intentionally degrade quality despite competition from rivals.
I. Network Effects and the Incentive to Degrade
Quality
Search engines are the gateway to Internet content; they
provide a crucial mapping function, without which the digital
world would become largely inaccessible. The major search
engines do not charge users for searching the web. Consumers
often "pay" with their personal data, used by many search
engines to target consumers via behavioral ads.
To differentiate themselves from one another, search
engines compete for users on quality. Although quality has
multiple dimensions,26 we focus on one important quality
dimension for search engines: the relevance of search results to
the search inquiry. In 2010, the European Commission
investigated a licensing agreement between Microsoft and
Yahoo regarding search engine technology.27 The Commission
found that search engines compete over the quality of search
results (i.e., their relevance and speed) as well as the quality of
the user interface. 28 The "quality and relevance of the
algorithmic search engine" was, the Commission found, "the
most important factor in attracting users to a particular search
engine "29
A search engine's commercial model relies on its
intermediary role, connecting "content providers (who want
users), users (who want content), and advertisers (who want
users)." 30 As explained in the FTC Staff Report, "Although a
user does not pay for the web search service, the user's focused
interest - or intent - is very valuable to advertisers, because
users are effectively identifying themselves as potential
customers through the content of their queries." 31  The
26 See, e.g., Ocello, Sj6idin & Subocs, supra note 9, at 9 ("Privacy could be
regarded as a non-price parameter of competition which may be degraded
by the merged entity post-merger.").
27 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077).
28 Id. at 101.
29 Teresa Vecchi, Jerome Vidal & Viveca Fallenius, The Microsoft/Yahoo!
Search Business Case, 2 EUR. COMM'N COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 41, 46
(2010).
30 Lianos & Motchenkova, supra note 14, at 421.
31 Memorandum from FTC Bureau of Competition Staff to the Comm'n on
Google Inc. 8. (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://graphics.wsj.com/google-
8
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intermediary role of search engines enables them to derive
their revenue from advertising. 32 For example, in 2013, 91
percent of Google's revenues came from advertisers 33 and 79
percent of Yahoo!'s total revenue came from display and search
advertising.3 4
Search engine algorithms provide users with "sponsored"
results and "organic" results.35 In the case of "sponsored"
search results, most advertisers pay search engines on a cost-
per-click basis. 36 Since payment is dependent upon a user
clicking an ad, search engines generate revenues "primarily by
delivering relevant, cost-effective online advertising."37 Indeed,
the goal of AdWords, Google's main auction-based advertising
program, "is to deliver ads that are so useful and relevant to
ftc-report [https://perma.cc/5RUP-FHQS] [hereinafter FTC Staff Report].
A few caveats are in order about portions of this report, which the FTC
released (mistakenly) under the Freedom of Information Act to the Wall
Street Journal. First, only the even pages were released, so the missing
odd pages may have contained important qualifications. Second, other
reports, including any prepared by the FTC economists and Google, were
not released. Third, although the staff recommended that the FTC file a
complaint, the Commissioners elected not to do so. Google said in
response to the report's disclosure, "We understand that what was sent
to the Wall Street Journal represents 50% of one document written by
50% of the FTC case teams. Ultimately both case teams (100%)
concluded that no action was needed on search display and ranking.
Speculation about consumer or competitor harm turned out to be entirely
wrong. On the other issues raised, we quickly made changes as agreed
with the FTC." The FTC Report on Google's Business Practices, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 24, 2015, http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report
[https://perma.cc/WPXG-GFAZ].
32 Microsoft/Yahoo!, supra note 28, at 33.
33 Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter
Google 2013 10-K].
34 Yahoo! Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 13 (Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter
Yahoo 2013 10-K].
35 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 100.
36 Id. at 77 35, 45; Ameho & Magos, supra note 18, at 50 (internal footnotes
omitted):
The expected revenue from an ad is contingent on the
probability that an ad is clicked (measured by the likelihood
that users click on ads, also known as the Click Through
Rate ('CTR')) since advertisers pay platforms only when
users click on the displayed ads. Search platforms use a
Iquahty' score, that reflects the expected CTR, to adjust the
ranking accordingly. Google was the first to introduce the
idea of ranking the ads in 2002 by weighting the
advertisers' bids with the 'quality score'. As explained on its
web site, Google currently uses a variety of indicators that
try to measure quality and determine the quality score of an
advertiser.
37 Google 2013 10-K, supra note 33, at 3 (emphasis added); see also
Microsoft/Yahoo!, at 101.
9
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search queries or web content that they are a form of
information in their own right."38
Defenders of sponsored search results downplay the market
power of general search engines, pointing to mobile
applications as alternative platforms for search inquiries. The
data does not support this assertion. Even in the past year, the
number of search queries has increased in the U.S. 39 "As
consumers shift their digital activity to mobile, growth in the
search market is being driven by both smartphones (up 17
percent from the prior year) and tablets (up 28 percent)," while
desktop search "has declined marginally during the same
period."40  Moreover, Google's "strong leadership on both
smartphones and tablets boosts its share of the multi-platform
search market by several percentage points vs. desktop
alone ."41
In determining whether these search engines' practices
violate antitrust law, we first consider whether there are
barriers to entry in the search engine market. Next, we analyze
positive feedback loops and network effects to better
understand search engines' incentives and abilities to degrade
quality.42
38 Google 2013 10-K, supra note 33, at 4.
39 Adam Lella & Andrew Lipsman, 2015 U.S. Digital Future in Focus,
COMSCORE (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-
Whitepap ers/2015/2015-US-Digital-Future-in-Focus
[https://perma.ce/CPJ3-86LA] ("total U.S. multi-platform web search
market grew 5 percent in query volume in Q4 2014 vs. the previous
year").
40 Id.
41 Id.("Google remains the leader in the U.S. explicit core search market
with 66 percent market share of search queries conducted in Q4 2014,
followed by Bing at 20 percent and Yahoo at 11 percent. Bing increased
its market share in 2014, while Yahoo's recent search partnership with
Firefox has also bolstered its share."). Moreover smartphone users, in one
2014 survey, spent more time with apps they've downloaded from
Facebook and Google than with any other company: "Of the apps they
chose to download, users spent 13% of their total time in Facebook's
apps," and 12% of their time with Google apps. Matt Rosoff, Facebook
and Google Are Winning the App War, BUSINESS INSIDER UK (June 29,
2015), http://uk.businessinsider. com/facebook-and-google-are-winning-
the-app-war-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/5U67-77JH].
42 This part is derived from MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG
DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY (Oxford University Press, forthcoming
2016) (discussing data-driven network effects).
10
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A. The Importance of Entry Barriers and Switching
Costs in Competition Law
Beyond per se violations, antitrust analysis centers upon
ease of entry into the market at issue. 43 According to the
literature, a company cannot maintain dominance when entry
into its market is: timely (generally under two years), likely
(profitable for the entrants), and sufficient (the entrants would
attain sufficient business to prevent the exercise of market
power by the incumbent firms). As the European Commission
stated, "[w]hen entering a market is sufficiently easy, a merger
is unlikely to pose any significant anti-competitive risk."44
Suppose entry barriers in the search market were low. In this
case, if the merging search engines were to reduce quality
below competitive levels, entrants could presumably seize the
opportunity to profit and competition would be fully restored.
Whether this is empirically true is another matter. 45
Relatedly, antitrust authorities evaluate whether a
dominant company's customers face high switching costs. 46 If
so, the company can increase price and degrade quality even in
the presence of competitors. The U.S. Supreme Court explained
how prohibitive switching costs enabled Kodak to manipulate
the aftermarket of parts and servicing for their photocopiers:
"If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have
purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked in," will
tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing
equipment brands."47
43 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (absent
direct evidence, monopoly power "may be inferred from a firm's
possession of a dominant share of a relevant market that is protected by
entry barriers"). Entry barriers "are factors (such as certain regulatory
requirements) that prevent new rivals from timely responding to an
increase in price above the competitive level." Id.
44 EUROPEAN COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 68 ("For entry to
be considered a sufficient competitive constraint on the merging parties,
it must be shown to be likely, timely and sufficient to deter or defeat any
potential anti-competitive effects of the merger.").
45 See generally Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral
Antitrust, 86 IND. L. J. 1527 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral
Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 Loy. U.
CHI. L. J. 513 (2007).
46 PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir.
1997) ("Switching costs are borne by customers who have already
purchased a product and who would then incur some cost in switching to
another product.").
47 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476-77
(1992) (noting that "a seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive
prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high relative to the
increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were
high relative to the number of new purchasers" and how this strategy is
11
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The search engine market is believed to have low barriers
to entry as well as minimal switching costs. Some claim that
"[o]nline markets are notable for their low entry barriers and
typically do not require big data for entry."48 Google's
Chairman, for example, stated that "[t]he barriers to entry are
negligible, because competition is just one click away." 49
Because search engines are all free, easy to use, and one click
away, switching costs would likely be low.
Given these attributes, how could any search engine
maintain market power while intentionally degrading quality?
There is no empirical support for concluding that entry barriers
are invariably low or high across online markets. The reality is
that entry analysis, as in other markets, is fact-specific.
B. Network Effects as a Barrier to Entry
One important barrier to entry involves network effects,
which can be direct or indirect. Direct network effects arise
when a consumer's utility from a product increases as others
use the product.50 A classic example is the telephone. As more
individuals acquire telephones, the number of people a caller
can reach increases, leading to the telephone's enhanced
utility. Indirect network effects arise when people increasingly
use a product or technology (for example, software platforms),
leading to its betterment. Microsoft's desktop computer
operating system is a classic example: the more people that use
the platform, "the more there will be invested in developing
very appealing when the seller can price discriminate between its locked-
in customers and potential new customers).
48 Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data,
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Dec. 2014).
49 Eric Schmidt, Why Google Works, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost. com/eric-schmidt/why-google-
works b 6502132.html [https://perma.cc/58UF-DW4H].
50 Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": From Terminal
Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 560-61 (2009) ("The defining
characteristic of network industries is the increasing value of their
products to users as the number of users increases, a phenomenon called
,network effects' or demand-side economies of scale"; the increased value
can come directly ("having a greater number of interconnections as a
result of more users" (e.g., telephones)) or indirectly ("having more
supporting complements developed for that product as the number of
users increases" (e.g., Windows operating system))); see also United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing
the "positive network effects" of Windows); Case T-201/04, Microsoft
Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (discussing the indirect network
effects of streaming media players).
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products compatible with that platform, which, in turn
reinforces the popularity of that platform with users."51
Online multi-sided markets may have several network
effects. Social networks, like Facebook, exhibit traditional
network effects. As more people join Facebook, the value in
using the social network increases. We explore three other
types of network effects that characterize the search engine
market.
1. Trial and Error
The first potential network effect is linked to the scale of
search inquiries processed by a search engine. Trial-and-error,
or learning by doing, means that more searches increase the
search engine's likelihood of identifying relevant results. A
search engine cannot read the consumer's mind. When a
consumer enters a query, the search engine quickly generates
an opinion as to what information users will find most useful. 52
Google's Executive Chairman explained:
[S]earch terms . . . are processed by the search
engine's mathematical algorithms, which
determine the probability that any given
webpage will be responsive to the search. The
user then receives results that are rank-ordered
based on the search engine's judgment of the
likelihood that each result matches what the
user was seeking in entering the search terms. 53
The search engine can record which links, if any, its users
actually choose. If users select a link originally offered on the
third or fourth page of results, the search engine's algorithms
can utilize that information to move that link up the list and
demote less frequently selected links. 54 As more searches are
51 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 1061
[hereinafter CFI Microsoft].
52 Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Pamela Jones Harbour, In the Matter
of Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, at 7 (Dec. 20, 2007)
("Type the search term 'apple' into the Google search engine, and Google
will 'know' whether the user is focusing on food (apple recipes) or
technology products (Apple computers), depending on which websites the
user recently visited (Cooking Light versus MacWorld) as well as what
searches she recently conducted (Golden Delicious versus iPod).").
53 The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.).
54 FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 14, quoting Google's former chief of
search quality Udi Manber:
The ranking itself is affected by the click data. If we
discover that, for a particular query, hypothetically, 80
percent of people click on Result No. 2 and only 10 percent
13
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run, the search engine gains more trials, generating the
necessary information to predict consumer preferences. Each
user provides the search engine with feedback regarding any
errors. The search engine will respond by quickly recalibrating
its offerings. 55 Increased traffic thus improves search results. 56
A user may not care if his or her neighbors use the same
search engine. But one can benefit (and one's utility can
increase) when others uses the same search engine. Unlike the
telephone, the quality and utility of search engines can
increase regardless of the individual's connection to other
users. In fact, the more heterogeneous the sample size, the
better the search engine's capability to identify relevant
responses for both popular and less frequent queries ("tail"
queries). 57
As a result, entry barriers into the search engine market
are high.58 In 2010, Microsoft reportedly invested "more than
$4.5 billion into developing its algorithms and building the
physical capacity necessary to operate Bing."59 Although a new
entrant can hire tech talent, it would still lack the scale of this
trial-and-error experimentation.6 0 Microsoft argued, and the
European Commission agreed, "scale is an important element
to be an effective competitor."6 1 With fewer trials, entrants
click on Result No. 1, after a while we figure out, well,
probably Result 2 is the one people want. So we'll switch it.
Other Google executives confirmed that "click data is important for many
purposes, including, most importantly, providing 'feedback' on whether
Google's search algorithms are offering its users high quality results." Id.
55 Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc. Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Eric
Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its
Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid
Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and
Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press
releases/2010/255377.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJY-GBU4].
56 FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 14 (stating "[t]he more search users
there are at any given time, the more experiments can be run, the faster
they can be completed, and the more improvements that can be made to
the search algorithms" and how "search providers run experiments on
large volumes of users"); Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 44,
46.
51 FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 14; Microsoft/Yahoo!, supra note 28,
at 162 (noting Microsoft's claim).
58 FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 76 ("Along with specialized
algorithms, search and search advertising platforms require enormous
investments in the technology and infrastructure required to crawl and
categorize the entire Internet.").
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 153; see also FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 76 (noting
14
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have fewer opportunities to predict search terms, observe
subsequent errors, and perceive trends (consumers' search
terms relating to a hot topic). Entrants' ability to identify sites
that consumers prefer is likely to remain inferior, leaving the
entrant at a competitive disadvantage in attracting consumers
and advertisers. 62 Recognizing this, a smaller search engine
may instead specialize in specific functions, such as travel and
flight options on travel-specific Internet sites, like Kayak and
Expedia. However, by becoming a niche player, the search
engine could lose a significant segment of the population. 63
Narrower user groups skew search results to match their
preferences, which may differ from those of other groups.
Accordingly, an older user group may through usage make the
search engine less attractive to younger user groups. Medium-
sized engines could collaborate to widen their respective search
groups. Indeed, Microsoft justified its Yahoo partnership as
necessary to achieve greater scale of behavioral trial-and-error
learning.64 Before the partnership, fewer people used Microsoft
that Internet search, search advertising, and search syndication are
"markets characterized by substantial scale effects").
62 Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World:
An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769,
784 (2010) ("Google search engine has become further entrenched as the
dominant search site, and the firm has accumulated even more search
data. Given the role of network effects, one might wonder whether any
other firm will be able to chip away at Google's search supremacy
without access to a comparable trove of data.") (internal citations
omitted); EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, PRIVACY AND COMPETITIVENESS IN
THE AGE OF BIG DATA: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DATA PROTECTION,
COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
35 (preliminary opinion Mar. 2014) [hereinafter EDPS Preliminary
Opinion] ("Successful online providers persuade increasing numbers of
customers to provide more personal information which increases the
value of the service to advertisers, thus generating 'network effects'
whereby yet more customers are attracted to the service.").
63 Yusuf Mehdi, Remarks at the Credit Suisse Annual Technology
Conference (Dec. 1, 2009) (emphasis added):
[T]here's this kind of inverse power loss, where 39 percent of
the users account for 66 percent of all the searches. I think
of them as the heavy searchers. Ourselves and Yahoo! and
others have been losing heavy searchers for the last number
of years. Since the Bing launch, we've actually inverted
that, we're actually growing heavy searchers. And when you
look at the demographics, we are over-indexed on 18 to 24
year olds now as a result of those heavy users. Before that,
we were over-indexed on 65-year plus in terms of
demographics, which is our MSN base.
64 In December 2009, Microsoft partnered with Yahoo! to provide the
exclusive algorithmic and paid search platform for the Yahoo! web sites.
Microsoft believed this agreement would allow it over time to improve
the effectiveness and increase the value of its "search offering through
greater scale in search queries and an expanded and more competitive
15
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and Yahoo's search engines than Google. As Microsoft's then
CEO said, "it turns out there's a feedback loop in the search
business, where the most searches you serve, or paid ad
searches you serve, the more you learn about what people click
on, what's relevant, and it turns out that scale drives
knowledge which then can turn around and redrive innovation
and relevance."6 5 The OECD found increasing returns to scale
from data where "the strong get stronger and the weak get
weaker, leading to extreme outcomes."66
In the search engine market, increased market usage and
greater market share correlates with increased quality. Engine
users benefit when other individuals conduct searches. As the
search engine conducts more trial-and-error experiments, its
superior results will likely attract still others to use the search
engine, leading to a positive feedback loop.
2. Scope of Data
A second potential network effect involves the scope of data
on the user. Search engines use a variety of personal data from
users to improve results. Users may be registered with other
services offered by the company, including email, browsers,
texting, and mapping service. The company is thus able to
develop more comprehensive user profiles that better predict
that particular individual's tastes and interests. Search
engines can use this information to better target the user with
personalized organic and sponsored search results.67
search and advertising marketplace." Microsoft Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 6 (July 28, 2011).
65 Steve Ballmer & Carol Bartz, Remarks from the Conference Call Held to
Announce the Search Engine Agreement Between Yahoo! and Microsoft
(July 29, 2009) (transcript available in Microsoft News Center).
66 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION FOR
GROWTH AND WELL-BEING: INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT 29 (2014)
[hereinafter OECD Interim Synthesis Report]:
The accumulation of data can lead to significant
improvements of data-driven services which in turns can
attract more users, leading to even more data that can be
collected. This "positive feedback makes the strong get
stronger and the weak get weaker, leading to extreme
outcomes" (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). For example, the
more people use services such as Google Search, or
recommendation engines such as that provided by Amazon,
or navigation systems such as that provided by TomTom,
the better the services as they become more accurate in
delivering requested sites and products, and providing
traffic information, and the more users it will attract.
67 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 40 (noting that a "growing number of both search and non-
search ads are also behaviourally targeted").
16
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Suppose the search engine provides a mapping service. The
search engine, in collecting users' geo-location data, knows
where its users typically walk or drive during the week. When
the user searches for restaurants, the search engine can use
the geo-location data to recommend restaurants in the
immediate vicinity. But the engine may also utilize other
personal data to recommend restaurants within the user's price
range (based on inferences of where the user lives and shops),
and that the user likely would enjoy (based on what the user's
friends recommend in the user's social networks). The OECD
noted, "data linkage enables 'super-additive' insights, leading
to increasing 'returns to scope'. Linked data is a means to
contextualize data and thus a source for insights and value
that are greater than the sum of its isolated parts (data silos)...
diverse data set allows the company to create even more
detailed profiles about its users that were not possible with
each single service." 68 With more users on the company's
platform of services, the company is better able to develop
predictive user profiles, target users with sponsored and
organic search results, and use behavioral ads to reach users
via the platform's different channels.
This leads to a correlation between loyalty and quality.
With more loyal users on the platform, the search engine is
better able to learn about user preferences and thus improve
the relevance and quality of its results.
68 OECD Interim Synthesis Report, supra note 66, at 29 (internal citation
omitted).
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3. Spillover and Snowball Effect
Network effects on the free side can spill over to the paid
side, and each can reinforce the other. "The reuse of data
generates huge returns to scale and scope which lead to
positive feedback loops in favour of the business on one side of
the market, which in turn reinforces success in the other
side(s) of the market."69 The inflow of many users with
heterogeneous search inquiries will attract a greater variety of
advertisers to the platform.7 0
This phenomenon is not unique to online search engines. As
more people watch the Super Bowl or World Cup, for example,
more advertisers become interested in the programs'
viewership. The same applies to newspapers and newsweeklies.
But unlike television shows and print media, search engines
can engage in advanced behavioral advertising, potentially
yielding significant value for advertisers.71
69 Id. at 29; see also Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 46 (noting
that the search business "is subject to network effects in that scale can
improve the quality of the search results and the quality of the matching
of the ads with the queries").
70 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 157 (stating that all of the advertisers responding to the
market investigation highlighted that Google's query volume was one of
the main reasons why Google was a "must have" for search advertising
campaigns); id. at 163 ("Higher query volume in turn generates ad
inventory."); Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 44.
71 As Harbour and Koslov state:
In online advertising, an advertiser gets the most "bang for
its buck" when its ads generate more "click-throughs"-
meaning that a user's interest is piqued, and the user
completes an action, such as clicking on the ad to pursue
more information. The point of traditional, non-behavioural
display advertising is a numbers game: it seeks to place a
given ad in front of as many eyeballs as possible, figuring
that if a certain percent-age of viewers will respond to the
ad, more eyeballs will equal more click-throughs.
Behavioural advertising takes a more targeted approach. It
attempts to place highly relevant ads in front of the right
sets of eye-balls, to maximise the likelihood of a click-
through from each viewer. If the ads are likely to be more
effective at attracting customers, an advertiser will pay
more to place the ads, which will generate a larger revenue
stream for the Web site.
Harbour & Koslov, supra note 62, at 781; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN,
MISSION CREEP-Y: GOOGLE Is QUIETLY BECOMING ONE OF THE NATION'S
MOST POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES WHILE EXPANDING ITS INFORMATION-
COLLECTION EMPIRE 10 (Nov. 2014) ("The more narrowly and accurately
Google can target an ad to a user to match her interests, the more it can
charge advertisers for each view or click").
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By attracting more users on the free side of its services
platform, a company can collect a greater volume and variety of
personal data to develop user profiles. 72 The search platform
can use the inflow of personal data to better target consumers
with specific targeted advertising across its platform of free
services - such as sponsored search results, ads in email, and
display ads in videos - in the moments that precede a
purchasing decision. 73 By targeting users with more relevant
ads, the search engine increases its advertising revenue and
profits. Moreover, the search engine can target users with
these personalized ads across media, such as personal
computers, smartphones, tablets, and, soon, household
appliances; and across services, such as texts, maps, and video
players. This too increases the likelihood of consumers clicking
on a relevant sponsored ad - which generates revenue on a
cost-per-click basis - or seeing a display ad - which generates
revenue on a cost-per-impression basis. As more users are
drawn to the platform and the search engine company amasses
a greater variety of data, its broad platform can optimize online
ad delivery and eventually reduce the advertisers' fixed costs of
managing multiple ad campaigns.
Consequently, the above network effects can have a
snowball effect: as a search engine generates more advertising
revenue, it can offer even more free services, 74 which induces
consumers to spend more time on the company's platform,
allowing it "to gather even more valuable data about consumer
behaviour, and to further improve services, for (new)
consumers as well as advertisers (on both sides of the
market)." 75
While the spillover and snowball effects may enhance the
position of an already successful search engine, to the possible
72 See, e.g., In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (noting that although some Google Apps
users, whether through the educational program or the partner program,
"did not receive content-based ads," their emails were "nevertheless
intercepted to create user profiles").
73 Google 2013 10-K, supra note 33, at 25 ("The main focus of our
advertising programs is to help businesses reach people in the moments
that matter across all devices with smarter ads that are relevant to their
intent and context, reflecting our commitment to constantly improve
their overall web experience.").
74 OECD Interim Synthesis Report, supra note 66, at 29 (noting how these
"self-reinforcing effects may increase with the number of applications
provided on a platform, e.g. bundling email, messaging, video, music and
telephony as increasing returns to scope kicks in and even more
information becomes available thanks to data linkage").
75 OECD Interim Synthesis Report, supra note 66, at 29; see also FTC Staff
Report, supra note 31, at 76 (discussing this "virtuous cycle" and how it
represents a "significant barrier for any potential entrant").
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detriment of its competitors, we note that in themselves, these
effects are not likely to degrade the quality of the search
engine's services. In fact, the quality of search results would
likely improve due to these network effects.7 6
II. Reduction of Quality in Search Results
Having explored the three network effects, we consider
whether, and the extent to which, these network effects provide
a firm with the latitude to intentionally degrade the quality of
its search results, and whether the network effects taper off
beyond a certain threshold. It is generally accepted that a
competitive market environment will "increase quality for a
given price or reduce price for a given level of quality."77 It is
also assumed that consumers can factor differences in price
and quality into their comparisons of products. Indeed, in many
instances these two assumptions hold and a positive correlation
between competition and quality exists. However, one may
identify instances in which the positive correlation between
competition and quality breaks down. Such may be the case
when consumers are limited in their ability to accurately
assess quality differences, which can be due to external factors
16 Policymakers, businesses, and researchers can also benefit from these
network effects, in using search data to assess market trends, which the
industry calls "nowcasting." See, e.g., Auction.com Launches Real Estate's
First Nowcast Leverages Industry, Transactional and Google Search
Data to Provide Accurate Real-Time Market Intelligence, AUCTION.COM
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.auction.com/lp/company-information/press-
releases/auction-com-launches-real-estates -first-nowcast-leverages -
industry-transactional-and-google-search-data-to-provide-accurate-real-
time-market-intelligence [https://perma.cc/N7ZF-QXMP] (noting how this
was "the real estate industry's first Nowcast, a new housing report that
combines industry data, proprietary company transactional data and
publicly available Google Trends data to predict market trends as they
are occurring - weeks before the findings of other benchmark studies are
released"). The press release cites Google's economist that, "By layering
industry-specific transactional data and subject-matter expertise over
that search data, organizations such as Auction.com are able to create
powerful predictive models for accurately forecasting buying behavior in
the present and for the coming months." Id.; see also Kenneth Cukier &
Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, The Rise of Big Data: How It's Changing the
Way We Think About the World, 92 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 28, 33 (2013)
(noting how Google's massive data set of searches, while imperfect,
provided strong correlations in near-real time of outbreaks of seasonal
flu); University of Warwick, Adapative "Nowcasting" Key to Accurate Flu
Data Trends Using Google Search Terms, SCIENCEDAILY (Oct. 30, 2014),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/10
/141030114853.htm [https://perma.cc/KH8Z-QNAT].
77 OECD Quality Report, supra note 11, at 22, 97.
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such as deceptive claims or dispositional factors such as
consumer biases or imperfect willpower. 78
While it is generally expected that the flow of information
through advertising and marketing will assist consumers in
appraising the quality of a good or service and subsequently
determining its value, imperfect information undermines this
process. When customers cannot accurately assess the quality
of a product or service, a supplier may not be rewarded for
improving quality. In these instances, it would be rational for
such supplier to divert investment from quality enhancement
to other channels. The U.K. competition authority observed,
"Imperfect information about quality can be a particularly
severe problem for infrequently purchased goods or goods the
quality of which cannot be verified even after purchase - so-
called 'credence' goods." 79
The inability to successfully communicate the quality of
goods and the resulting disincentive to invest in quality is
known as the "lemons problem." 80 Because of the lemons
problem, competitive pressure will not always yield greater
quality. Rational, profit-maximizing firms may conclude that
quality manipulation is an optimal strategy when the cost of
improving quality outweighs the corresponding gain.
We explore three necessary conditions for quality
degradation in search results: first, the search engine has the
ability and economic incentive to degrade quality; second,
consumers cannot accurately assess quality; and third,
imperfect information flows make it difficult or costly for others
to convey to consumers the products' or services' inherent
quality differences and to prompt users to switch.
A. Search Engine's Ability and Incentive to Degrade
Quality
Consumers and companies are harmed when the search
engine intentionally degrades the quality of organic search
78 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 7, at 41.
79 OECD Quality Report, supra note 11, at 113.
80 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922)
("The honest manufacturer's business may suffer, not merely through a
competitor's deceiving his direct customer, the retailer, but also through
the competitor's putting into the hands of the retailer an unlawful
instrument, which enables the retailer to increase his own sales of the
dishonest goods, thereby lessening the market for the honest product.");
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970) (nothing that the cost
of dishonesty includes "loss incurred from driving legitimate business out
of existence").
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results below levels that consumers prefer.81 In these instances,
a search engine can, but intentionally elects not to, provide
users with the most relevant results in response to their
queries.
In assessing the relevance of results to users' inquiries, the
search engine algorithm will identify more relevant results
upfront. Users generally avoid navigating to the ninth or tenth
page of search results. One 2013 study found that the top
listing in Google's organic search results received, on average,
32.5 percent of the traffic, compared to 17.6 percent for the
second position, 11.4 percent for third position, 8.1 percent for
fourth, and 6.1 percent for fifth.8 2 The average traffic continued
to decline - the search result that was ranked tenth attracted
2.4 percent of traffic, and the result ranked fifteenth received
only 0.4 percent.8 3 Another study found, "[s]ites listed on the
first Google search results page generate 92% of all traffic from
an average search. When moving from page one to two, the
traffic dropped by 95%, and by 78% and 58% for the subsequent
pages."8 4 Given the importance of ranking, search engines can
intentionally degrade quality (along the parameter of
relevance) in several ways.
A search engine can intentionally degrade quality by
providing fewer, and ranking lower, more relevant organic
search results. To incentivize users to click on sponsored
advertisements or the results of its affiliated business, the
engine can rank its sponsored results higher and demote its
more relevant, organic results. The European Commission
discussed the theoretical "trade off that search platforms
appear to face between the incentive to provide relevant
organic and paid results."8 5 Namely, prioritizing relevant
results could lead to the search engine "losing revenues on the
advertising side (i.e. less clicks on ads) due to users clicking
81 For a discussion of some of the adverse welfare effects of intentional
search degradation, see Michael Luca et al., Does Google Content
Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper 16-035) (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.
?abstract id-2667143 [https://perma.cc/NX45-25GS]. For an overview of
the potential adverse welfare effects of dominant online platforms, see
ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (Harvard
University Press, forthcoming 2016).





85 Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 47 n. 13.
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predominantly on the organic side (especially if both types of
clicks would bring the user to the same kind of information)."86
Under a "hold-up" scenario, the search engine could lower
the ranking of potential advertisers appearing in the organic
search to pressure the businesses to advertise with the search
engine. Advertisers would bid for keywords to get the attention
of viewers who do not scroll down the list of search results.8 7 As
the search engine expands to other services, such as offering a
vertical search for shopping or restaurant reviews, it may
"alter the ranking of the organic search results such that, from
the user's perspective, firms offering competing products to the
sponsored links are given a less-than-optimal ranking on the
organic side."88
Search engines can also intentionally degrade quality by
mingling relevant organic results with less relevant sponsored
results.8 9 The engine might provide relevant restaurant
information, for example, but promote the reviews from its
affiliated online review service and bury the reviews from a
competitor's more robust sample.
This intentional degradation of quality can hurt consumers
through higher search costs (in having to spend more time to
find the relevant result), less relevant results (when under the
hold-up scenario companies refuse to advertise), and less
innovation (when companies know that however good their
products or services, they will be unable to effectively reach
consumers online). Given the importance of search engines as a
gateway to the Internet, intentional search degradation can
also chill the marketplace of ideas.90
Beyond having the ability to degrade the quality of search
results, search engines must also have the incentive to do so. A
86 Id.
87 MARTIN CAVE & HOWARD WILLIAMS, THE PERILS OF DOMINANCE:
EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF SEARCH IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 8
(2011).
88 See, e.g., Amelio & Magos, supra note 18 ("For instance, instead of
displaying links to additional merchants in the organic search results,
search engines could display links to 'informational' sites or placing the
links winning the auctions also in prominent positions in the organic
search results, in order to decrease substitution between organic and
paid searches."); FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 92 (stating that
"Google's threat (and willingness) to degrade its own web search
product-by banishing high-quality vertical websites from its web search
results altogether-suggests that Google's motive in scraping high-
quality content from its vertical competitors was not pro-competitive").
89 See, e.g., FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 24 (noting that "Google's
Universal Search results often were not labeled as being provided by
Google affiliated services, but were integrated directly into the search
results").
90 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001).
23
Stucke and Ezrachi: WHEN COMPETITION FAILS TO OPTIMIZE QUALITY: A LOOK AT SEARCH ENGI
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016 Quality, Competition, and Two-Sided Markets 93
search engine is interested in increasing usage on both the
advertiser and user sides of the market, particularly given the
network effects discussed in Part 1.91 The balance is essential.
If a search engine attracts many users, but few advertisers, the
number of relevant sponsored ads is insufficient, leading to less
clicks and less revenue for the search engine. In the opposite
situation, where advertisers far outnumber users, the quality
of organic search results will suffer, due to less trial-and-error
and less personal data. The few users in this scenario may
actually find the less relevant sponsored ads off-putting. By
maximizing both the number of users/search queries and
advertisers/sponsored search results, the search engine will
benefit from network effects.
However, revenues and profits come mostly from one side of
the market. Search engines have an economic incentive to
maximize the likelihood that its consumers will click on
sponsored advertisements. Clicking a sponsored search result
does not necessarily harm the consumer if he or she finds the
sponsored search result helpful. No one would begrudge the
search engine earning revenue for helping match the advertiser
with the search engine user.
1. Returns to Scale and Scope
An important variable concerning the search engine's
incentive to intentionally degrade quality involves returns to
scale and scope. Although search engines can degrade quality,
the network effects discussed in Part I may lessen an engine's
incentive or ability to do so. The OECD found non-linear,
increasing returns to scale as an engine's number of searches
and collection of personal data expanded.92 But returns to scale
and scope may level off at a certain point. Say that Google,
Yahoo!, and Bing have a relative advantage over a new
entrant, like Apple, as to providing relevant search results.
91 To benefit from these network effects, and the subsequent advertising
revenue, search engines, as the European Commission found, "will try to
attract as many participants on both sides of the platform as possible."
Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 48.
92 OECD Interim Synthesis Report, supra note 66, at 29; ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION AND DEV, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL,
GROWTHAND INNOVATION 171 (Oct. 10, 2013), http://dx.doi.org
/10.1787/9789264193307-en [https://perma.cc/KQ5E-86VZ] ("Supply-side
economies of scale may also occur in digital markets, most notably in the
context of search engines, where increased data from users allows for the
development of more accurate search algorithms."); Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev., Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey
of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value (OECD Digital Economy
Papers No. 220), at 34 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en
[https://perma.cc/39R4-WWAF].
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That advantage, and thus these players' market power, could
disappear as soon as Apple averages 10,000 daily inquiries in
those locales. In that case, neither Google, Yahoo!, nor Bing
would have the incentive to unilaterally degrade quality.
Competition would serve as an effective check.
Now suppose two search engines attract a random cross-
section of the population; one has five million daily searches
and the other five billion. Suppose one percent of the daily
searches involve a hot topic. The smaller search engine has
50,000 searches with which to experiment, the larger 50
million. While the larger search engine might do a better job
identifying and ranking the second or third tier of results for
the hot topic, both search engines have a sufficiently large
sample to identify the most relevant, popular results. However,
the results are different for esoteric search queries ("tail
queries"). Suppose a search, such as "law and economics
professors" and NCAA, averages one per 10 million searches.
The smaller search engine will get one search every two days
while the larger search engine gets 500 queries per day. If tail
queries make up a significant component of daily searches,
then the larger search engine will enjoy an inherent advantage.
Averaging five billion searches per day, leading search engines
are likely to provide more relevant results across the board
(from long tail to popular queries) than a smaller search
engine, even those averaging five million searches per day. The
larger search engine's results will continually improve as more
people use it, but the incremental benefits from scale (increase
in relevance) will taper off as the sample size approaches all
users.
Thus, a search engine's incentive and ability to degrade
quality will depend on whether the company is at a relative
advantage or disadvantage in scale compared with other search
engines. Microsoft and Yahoo! advanced this argument to the
European Commission to justify their 10-year partnership.
Microsoft would control the online web-wide algorithmic search
and search-advertising business of Yahoo!. The companies
argued that they needed to attain greater scale in order to
produce more relevant search results and effectively compete
against industry leader Google. Microsoft and Yahoo! asserted
that an increase in the number of queries and users would
lessen Microsoft's and Yahoo!'s incentive to shade quality.93
93 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 211-13. Moreover, Microsoft argued that the structure of
its transaction with Yahoo provided "a large incentive to innovate on the
search experience because, according to the definitive Agreements, the
publishing businesses of Microsoft and Yahoo will remain separate, and
the revenue attributable to either Yahoo or Microsoft depends on the
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This argument, of course, assumes that the benefits from
scale have not already levelled off for Microsoft and Yahoo. For
if Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google were all operating at or above
the minimum efficient scale for search queries and using
similar-enough algorithms, then the quality of their search
results should be roughly similar. If this were the case, quality
degradation could still occur, simply along the lines of tacit
collusion. Each search engine could monitor the other,
following the quality degradation of the next-worst player.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) accepted that the
benefits from scale might enable a combined Microsoft/Yahoo to
better compete against the dominant search engine,
commenting that the transaction would "enhance Microsoft's
competitive performance because it will have access to a larger
set of queries, which should accelerate the automated learning
of Microsoft's search and paid search algorithms and enhance
Microsoft's ability to serve more relevant search results and
paid search listings, particularly with respect to rare or 'tail'
queries." 94 With this larger pool of data, Microsoft could provide
a higher quality product. The DOJ believed that Microsoft's
"enhanced performance, if realized, should exert
correspondingly greater competitive pressure in the
marketplace."95
The European Commission also found scale to be an
important factor to effectively compete,96 with a caveat: while
Google "appears to perform better in terms of relevance
especially for [...] queries, this does not provide evidence that
scale leads to higher relevance for users, since the above
studies do not take into account the technology of the different
search engine which are not related to scale."97
The Commission found from the empirical studies Microsoft
submitted that a search platform's revenue per search
source of the search query." Id. at 208. Yahoo and Microsoft would only
earn revenue from ads that appear on their respective websites (and
those of their publisher affiliates), so each would have a strong incentive
to attract users to their own entry points. Id.
94 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the
Internet Search and Paid Search Advertising Agreement Between




96 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 153; Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 46 (noting
that EC's market investigation "confirmed that scale is an important
aspect in the economics of the industry"); see also id. at 47.
97 COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo!, at 168.
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increased with the volume of search queries. 98 Competitors that
responded to the Commission's market investigation indicated
"almost unanimously that scale is important in order to be an
effective competitor in search advertising,"99  and that
"Microsoft did not have enough traffic to compete effectively
with Google." 100 Google disagreed, arguing, "[scale's] degree of
importance has been largely overstated." 101 The Commission
did not elaborate, but noted that Google acknowledged "the
value of incremental data decreases as the amount of data
increases."1 02 The issues of when that happens and for which
types of searches, and the quality differential this might create,
were left unresolved.10 3
Even when effects of scale taper off, search engines can still
have a relative advantage in scope by offering users more
personalized search results. To the extent users are attracted
to one search engine, even after scale and scope effects taper
off, the search engine benefits from being the "must use" option
for advertisers. This leads to the inclusion of more personalized
ads.
Accordingly, the largest search engine, even with multiple
competitors, could use its significant advantage in scale and
scope to degrade quality on the free side and increase its
market power or profits. A larger search engine could
intentionally degrade the quality of its search results by a
small but significant amount, and still produce better search
results than its smaller rivals due to network effects. This
might involve, for example, the search engine promoting its
own restaurant review site (which has on average far fewer
98 Id. at 169.
99 Id. at 173.
100 Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 46.
101 COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo!, at 174.
102 Id. at 174.
103 In discussing the "scale curve," the FTC also noted the dispute. Google
acknowledged "the importance of scale in the abstract." FTC Staff
Report, supra note 31, at 16. Its internal documents were "replete with
references to the 'virtuous cycle' among users, advertisers, and
publishers." Id. Its executives, however, testified of diminishing returns
from scale, and that Google has "enough users already that more users
don't make it much better." Id. at 124 n.77 (quoting Schmidt). Google
also argued that "Bing's query and advertiser volume have passed the
point at which scale should - or would - matter significantly to
Microsoft, and that any volume gains made by Bing would yield minimal
improvements in either Bing's search quality or its monetization ability."
Id. at 16. Microsoft agreed that there were generally diminishing
returns to scale. Id. So the "main bone of contention between Google and
Microsoft is where on this scale curve Microsoft currently operates. This
is an important question, but one which evades easy answers. This is, in
part, because neither party can identify a fixed number of queries or ads
that constitutes the 'minimum efficient' point of operation." Id.
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reviewers and reviews per restaurant) over a competing site
(which has a larger, more robust sample size, with far more
reviewers and reviews). 104 Using these tactics, Google could
shade its search results to a greater extent than the smallest
search engine, DuckDuckGo.
2. Disincentives to Degrading Quality
Conversely, smaller search engines will have less incentive
(or ability) to degrade quality. The quality of their search
results is already relatively inferior, given the scale at which
they operate, the scope of data they collect, and the number
and diversity of advertisers. Further degrading their search
results risks losing their small pool of users. Unless a smaller
search engine differentiates its services to such a degree that it
no longer competes based on quality of search results, the
smaller search engine will have less incentive and ability to
intentionally degrade quality.
But even a dominant search engine will have a disincentive
to skew search quality when the practice reduces profits. Even
the dominant search engine cannot afford to provide too many
irrelevant sponsored ads; if users do not click the ads, the
engine does not generate income. As it provides more irrelevant
sponsored results, the engine risks conditioning consumers to
ignore sponsored ads, or inducing them to switch to other
search engines. Advertisers themselves can serve as a check
and limit the extent to which search engines degrade quality on
the free side. An advertiser associated with an engine that
bombards users with irrelevant ads may feel the value of its
brand degrading by association. These advertisers may then
turn to other advertising venues. 105 Moreover, the dominant
search engine would still need to invest in improving its search
algorithms. As the European Commission found, search
engines "not only try to develop new services (leap-frog
innovation) but also constantly strive to innovate incrementally
on existent services in order to be able to deliver better services
to both advertisers and users."106
With the exception of these limited checks, the dominant
search engine can afford to degrade quality in the face of
competition. It enjoys a relative quality advantage from
network effects over its smaller search engine rivals. Despite
the potential consequences of excessive degradation, certain
levels of quality degradation could actually lead to an increase
in the dominant engine's profits and market power.
104 See Luca et al., supra note 81, at 26-27.
105 See Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18,
2010) (C 1077), at 204.
106 Id. at 109.
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B. Consumers' Ability to Accurately Assess Quality
Differences
Even when search engines have the ability and economic
incentive to degrade the quality of their search results, they
will not do so where consumers are likely to perceive such
quality degradation and punish the platform by switching to
rival search engines.
Microsoft and Yahoo, for example, argued to the
Commission that they could not degrade the quality of their
search engine results, given Google's presence. 10 7 In addition,
Microsoft asserted, "the search industry is closely monitored by
industry participants and opinion leaders . . . Microsoft
therefore claims that it cannot run the risk of even small
degradations in quality, as users will become aware and switch
to Google."108 But this argument assumes that consumers can
detect quality degradation.
In effect, Microsoft's argument is a tautology: by claiming
that search engines cannot degrade quality without consumers
noticing, Microsoft can point to consumers who do not (or
cannot) perceive quality degradation as proof that search
engines are operating properly.
Search engine users undoubtedly can detect significant
quality degradations, such as completely unrelated results
(such as information about telephones coming up in a search
for tennis shoes) and inaccurate results to straightforward,
fact-based queries (such as the search query "how many
kilometers in a mile").
A more complex scenario involves the comparative
relevance of organic and sponsored search results. Here the
quality of search results is relative. First, it is relative across
time. Search results can improve in quality as, among other
things, more people use the search engine. Second, quality is
relative to the amount of relevant information available online.
As more information (such as books) is brought online and
more online material becomes searchable, a search engine will
become increasingly able to identify relevant information.
Thus, a smaller search engine may produce better quality
search results today than Yahoo! or Google did ten years ago.
Third, the quality of one search engine's results is relative to
the contemporaneous results of other search engines. Smaller
search engines may identify more relevant results for popular,
107 Id. at 212 ("[U]sers, according to the notifying party, notice inferior
(i.e. less relevant) search results and given the strong presence of Google
in the market they would direct their queries back to Google lowering
user engagement in Microsoft's platform.").
108 Id.
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straightforward search queries than for long tail queries (which
might arise once every million searches). Fourth, while the
results for some straightforward fact inquiries remain
constant, other queries and results can vary daily or weekly. So
the user expects the most relevant results (which can change
daily), not necessarily the same results they received yesterday
or last year.
Thus, aside from fact inquiries, consumers will likely assess
the quality of search results not on some objective or ideal
benchmark, but instead relative to what other search engines
offer. To notice quality degradation, users must run the same
search query, around the same time, on different search
engines.
1. The First Theorized Check on Quality
Degradation: Multi-Homing
Nothing prevents consumers from multi-homing searches,
and yet consumers infrequently make the same inquiry on
multiple search engines. As the European Commission found in
its investigation, "[t]he very limited share of user multi-homing
between Microsoft and Yahoo shows that users rarely run
checks between these two platforms."1°9 Yahoo users' second
choice was Google, 110 and the Commission confirmed the
parties' figures that the "vast majority of users 'single-homed'
on Google."111
Moreover, U.S. and E.U. market shares do not reflect
significant multi-homing. If users were frequently running the
same searches on Google, Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo, each
competitor would control approximately 25 percent of the
search market. In May 2015, Google continued to lead the U.S.
"explicit core search market" for desktop searches with a 64.1
percent market share, followed by Microsoft Sites with 20.3
percent, Yahoo Sites with 12.7 percent, Ask Network with 1.8
percent and AOL, Inc. with 1.2 percent. 1 2 Google has a greater
109 Id. at 221; see also Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 44
(noting the Commission finding that "users tend to 'single-home,'
meaning that they perform over 9 0% of their search queries within a
month on one single search engine").
110 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 224.
1 Vecchi, Vidal & Fallenius, supra note 29, at 46; see also COMP/M. 5727-
Microsoft/Yahoo!, at 102, 103.
112 Adam Lella, comScore Releases May 2015 U.S. Desktop Search Engine
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share of search inquiries on U.S. mobile phones and tablets.113
In Europe, Google has an even larger share of the search
market. In 2013, the Commission observed how Google "has
been holding market shares in web search well above 90% in
most European countries for several years now, a level which is
higher than in many other parts of the world."114
2. The Second Theorized Check on Quality
Degradation: Spot-Checking
Besides multi-homing, consumers can attempt to assess the
relative quality of search results by "spot-checking," i.e.,
occasionally running the same search query on other search
engines. As the European Commission stated, the "mere
presence of an alternative check may suffice to induce the
search engines to enhance the relevance of their organic
search." 115
Several problems exist with the theory that spot-checking
will prevent quality degradation. First, it is unclear how
frequently consumers actually spot-check (and whether they
randomly spot-check or are likelier to spot-check for certain
categories of search inquiries or at certain times). For example,
one survey asked search users "what they would do if a Google
search result did not contain the expected information." 116 34
percent of respondents indicated they would "return to the
search results page and try a different result," and 25 percent
said they would "return to Google to enter a new search."117 No
respondents answered that they would try another search
engine. These results may suggest that users perceive the
"switching costs" between search providers (or, alternatively,
the "costs of spot-checks") as higher than the expected benefit
of spot-checking.
Even if consumers spot-check, a larger search engine can
still intentionally degrade quality by a small, but significant,
113 Top 5 Mobile & Tablet Search Engines in United States from June 2014
to May 2015, STATCOUNTER GLOBAL STATS,
http://gs.statcounter.com/#mobile+tablet-search engine-US-monthly-
201406-201505 [https://perma.cc/WM4B-HQBL] (In May 2015, Google
had an 86.48 percent share, with Yahoo (7.89 percent) and Microsoft
(4.99 percent) trailing behind).
114 European Commission, Memo: Commission seeks feedback on
commitments offered by Google to address competition concerns -
questions and answers (Apr. 23, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release MEMO- 13-383 en.htm.
115 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 221 n.71.
116 Amy Gesenhues, Study: Top Reason a User Would Block a Site From a
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amount. Spot-checking may serve to keep smaller search
engines in check, but is unlikely to make a difference on large
search engines due to network effects. To illustrate, suppose an
individual generally runs 100 searches per week on Google, one
weekly quality check on Bing, and one monthly quality check
on DuckDuckGo. At the end of the year, Google would have
5200 searches, compared to Bing's 52 searches and
DuckDuckGo's 12 searches. Google, with its larger user
platform, would continue to attract more advertisers and have
more advertising revenue. With more search queries, Google
could intentionally degrade quality while still offering more
relevant organic search results and more relevant sponsored
search results than both Bing and DuckDuckGo. Despite spot-
checks, Google would be able to simultaneously degrade quality
and maintain its quality advantage over other engines due to
network effects.
Spot-check comparisons become even less effective when
applied to personalized search results. If a consumer not only
uses the platform's search engine, but also its email, mapping
services, and other offerings, comparisons with other search
engines that do not have the user's data become much harder.
Spot-checking also becomes less feasible with greater
differentiation among the search engines. For example, a
smaller search engine may differentiate its services on some
other parameter of quality. DuckDuckGo, for example,
highlights its superior privacy protections, using the tag line
"The search engine that doesn't track you." 118
Another problem with the spot-check theory is that
consumers would have to factor in whether their query is long-
tail or popular in order to reach an accurate conclusion on the
relative quality of a search engine's results. Rather than try to
ascertain which search engine does better for which type of
inquiry, the user may simply opt for the one that does a better
job overall.119
Consequently, even with consumers' spot-checking, larger
search engines can intentionally degrade quality, while smaller
search engines, given their quality disadvantages, cannot. A
consumer cannot discern the extent to which the dominant
118 DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com [https://perma.cc/8FG4-ZKH5].
119 FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at 66 ("In effect, users are habituated
into using Google for all their queries because of its comprehensive scope,
and so they may be more likely to tum to Google when they have
commercial queries, instead of starting at a vertical website. [Google's
Eric] Schmidt's testimony is corroborated by the representations of
several of the vertical search firms, who note that they are dependent on
horizontal search providers for significant amounts of their traffic,
because even many vertical search users tend to begin their search with
a query on Google, Bing or Yahoo!.").
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search engine has degraded quality, only that the larger search
engine generally produces somewhat better results across all
searches.
3. Branding as a Substitute for Quality
The discussion thus far highlights the difficulties for
rational consumers to objectively measure quality differences
and detect deteriorations in search quality. However, economic
literature has shown that consumers are not necessarily
rational, self-interested profit-maximizers with willpower. In
making decisions, consumers may be swayed by imperfect
indicia of quality. For example, some consumers believe that
price is correlated with quality, which is not always true. 120
However, because searching is free, these price effects are
absent. Instead, branding can affect consumers' perceptions of
quality.
Studies confirm the powerful effect of the Google brand in
particular. SurveyMonkey administered a test whereby
respondents were presented with two search result pages, one
with a page header labeled "Google" and the other with a page
header labeled "Bing." Respondents were asked which results
they preferred. Curiously, when the header labels were
swapped, more users preferred the "Google" labeled search
results. 121
Similarly, the European Commission found that search
engine users were unaware of Google's systematic favoring of
its own comparison-shopping product in its general search
results pages.1 22 Due to the quality boost that comes from scale,
network, and branding effects, consumers do not notice when a
leading search engine degrades quality in small but significant
ways.
C. Imperfect Information Flows
Although search engines do have an incentive and ability to
intentionally degrade the quality of search results, as well as a
user-base that would not be able to notice, search engines run
the risk that a rival could notify consumers of the quality
degradation. The third variable of our framework concerns
120 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 181-86 (2008).
121 Gesenhues, supra note 117; see also FTC Staff Report, supra note 31, at
66.
122 European Commission Press Release IP/14/116, Antitrust: Commission
Obtains From Google Comparable Display of Specialised Search Rivals,
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imperfect information flows that make it difficult or costly for
these rivals to convey to consumers the search engines'
inherent quality differences and induce consumers to switch.
Quality degradation is feasible when companies recognize that
neither they nor their competitors can easily or inexpensively
communicate this information to consumers and get them to
switch.
Both businesses harmed by search degradation and rival
search engines have the incentive to alert consumers of quality
degradation. For businesses, the degradation in search quality
can affect their ability to compete. Given the importance of
general search engines in directing traffic to their site, many
businesses are sensitive to their site's ranking in search
results. When a search engine artificially diverts traffic away
from their website, they may immediately feel the decline in
traffic and loss of business. Rival search engines are motivated
by network effects. Adding a user means better search results,
which can attract more users and advertisers. If consumers do
not multi-home search, then the contest for users can become
zero-sum: every search query on Bing or Yahoo! makes it less
likely that consumers will search on Google, narrowing the gap
between the competitors, and thus tapering the leading search
engine's advantage from network effects. Companies also have
the incentive to inform competition authorities, such as the
DOJ, FTC and European Commission.
Rival search engines have alerted consumers to their
superior quality. Microsoft, for example, advertised its quality
advantage over Google with its "Bing-it-on challenge."
Microsoft asked users to take a blind test, where users select
five search queries, and choose which results (Google's or
Bing's) they favor.123 In blind tests, according to Microsoft,
more U.K. residents preferred Bing's search results to
Google's. 124 Despite this advertising campaign, however, U.K.
residents still overwhelmingly use Google.1 25 Even if search
123 For an explanation and critique of this advertisement campaign, see Ian
Ayres, Emad Atiq, Sheng Li, Michelle Lu, Tom Maher & Christine
Tsang, A Randomized Experiment Assessing the Accuracy of Microsoft's
'BingIt On" Challenge, 26 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2013).
124 Bing blogs, Going Head-to-Head - And Why Online Searching Has
Changed Forever (Apr. 29, 2014),
https ://blogs.bing.com/uk/2014/04/29/going-head-to-head-and-why-online-
searching-has-changed-forever [https://perma.cc/4MA4-Q5MX] (noting
that "[d]espite having used Google's own top queries, after carrying out
10 searches, 46% of people surveyed picked Bing search results more
often, 37% of people picked Google results more often, and 17% of people
chose Bing and Google results an equal number of times").




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/3
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
engines tell consumers of a rival's degradation of search
results, they still need to convince those users to switch.
Why does Google still dominate by such a margin in search
results in the U.K.? One possibility is that Microsoft's sample
does not reflect the U.K. Internet-user population. A second
possibility is that Bing outperforms Google on some searches
(such as popular searches) but not other inquiries (such as
long-tail queries), where Google's scale comes into play.126
Alternatively, the distinction between objective and perceived
quality may explain the discrepancy. 127 A fourth possibility
may be linked to the benefit of loyalty and customized search
results based on user profiles. This consideration may be
further amplified due to status quo bias.
1. Status Quo Bias: The Power of Defaults
At times, consumers, as the European Commission
discussed, will stick with a default option even when a superior
alternative exists. 128 Status quo bias arose in a Commission
case involving Microsoft's Windows Media Player. 129 Pre-
installing software on a large number of smartphones may
make it less likely that consumers will switch to alternatives. 130
As the U.K. competition authority discussed in its Google/Waze
decision, integrating the pre-installed application with other
functions on the platform may further consumer
entrenchment.1 3 1 Thus, another confounding variable is the
search engine's ability to use status quo bias to degrade
quality, including less-visible proxies for quality such as
privacy protections. The search engine can, for example, collect
more personal data and provide less privacy protection for the
data, than consumers would otherwise prefer.
126 For a criticism of the Bing results, see Ian Ayres et al., A Randomized
Experiment Assessing the Accuracy of Microsoft's "Bing It On" Challenge
Claims, ISLANDIA (2013), http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres
/BingItOn Draft%209.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3TT-7URN]. For Microsoft's
response, see Matt Wallaert, Challenging the Challenge to the Bing It On
Challenge, BING BLOGS (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://blogs.bing.com/search/2013/10/02/challenging-the-challenge-to-the-
bing-it-on-challenge [https://perma.cc/5CLR-FYGW].
127 See supra Part II B.3.
128 For the importance of default options generally, see RICHARD H. THALER
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
129 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/C-3/39.530-Microsoft (tying) (Dec.16,
2009); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization, 8 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 545 (2012).
130 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 7217-Facebook/WhatsApp (Oct. 3,
2014) (C 7239) 24-25, at 111, 124 (discussing status quo bias).
131 Office of Fair Trading, Completed Acquisition by Motorola Mobility
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While Google is already the leader in search queries in the
United States on personal computers, its dominance
significantly increases on mobile devices. Google has a 64
percent market share on personal computers versus 86 percent
share on mobile phones and tablets. One explanation may be
that preferences or users differ between the two platforms. A
likelier explanation is status quo bias, as Google is the default
search engine for both the Apple and Android mobile operating
systems.
The Firefox/Yahoo case reflects the power of defaults. After
Firefox, an Internet browser, made Yahoo! its default search
engine, Yahoo's share grew from 8.6 percent in November 2014
to 10.9 percent of the U.S. search market in January 2015 - its
highest share in the past five years. 132 It appeared that this
growth was attributable to Firefox. When Firefox users were
separated out from Yahoo's overall share, Yahoo's remaining
share was reportedly "flat or down slightly vs. last month."133
Many Firefox users had previously used Google. After Firefox
changed its default search engine, Google sought to persuade
Firefox users to return to Google. Despite Google's efforts,
many Firefox users stuck with the new default engine,
Yahoo! 134
Search engines recognize the value of being the default
search engine on a browser, and pay the browser for this
right. 135 Google, for example, is the default engine on Apple's
Safari Internet browser. In exchange, Google reportedly paid
132 Greg Sterling, Firefox Deal Continues To Boost Yahoo As US Search




134 "StatCounter CEO Aodhan Cullen posted, 'Some analysts expected
Yahoo to fall in January as a result of Firefox users switching back to
Google. In fact Yahoo has increased US search share by half a percentage
point."' Greg Sterling, Firefox Deal Continues To Boost Yahoo as US
Search Share Grows Again in January, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 2,
2015), http://searchengineland.com/firefox-deal-continues -boost-yahoo-us-
search-share-grows-j anuary-2 13998 [https://perma.cc/P4DU-44PC];
Gregg Keizer, Yahoo Loses Some U.S. Share Gained from Firefox Deal,
COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 17, 2015), http ://www. computerworld.com/article
/2911108/yahoo-loses-some-us-share-gained-from -firefox-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/G3LQ-3YUT] (noting that after a January 2015 peak of
13 per cent, Yahoo's search share in February only dropped to 12.8 per
cent, and in March to 12.7 per cent).
135 See Greg Sterling, As Apple-Google Deal Expires, Who Will Win the
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Apple "$82 million in 2009, and $1 billion in 2013"136 and
2014.137 Defaults matter.
The battle over search may soon become the battle over the
default option, as inertia may trump quality differences among
the search engines. Search engines, in order to maintain or
grow their respective market shares, will compete to control
the key entry points for search. This includes, as the Firefox
and Safari deals show, being the default search engine on an
Internet browser, as well as entering into syndication
agreements with third-party websites. 138
Given the significant revenue stakes in capturing search
advertising markets, the battle over the default will lead to
search engines capturing and replacing key entry points (such
as Internet browser home pages) with their own products.
Search engines have the incentive to develop and promote their
own Internet browsers (such as Google's Chrome and
Microsoft's Internet Explorer) and operating systems (such as
Google's Android for mobile and Microsoft's Windows for mobile
and personal computers). 139 To the extent to which the search
136 Apple Working on Its Own Search Engine; Aims To Take on Google:
Report, IBN LIvE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/apple-
working-on-its -own-search-engine-aims -to-take-on-google-report/527597-
11.html [https://perma.cc/8NQF-JBKH].
137 Joel Rosenblatt & Adam Satariano, Google Paid Apple $1 Billion to Keep
Search Bar on iPhone, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 21, 2016,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-22/google-paid-apple- 1-
bilhon-to-keep -search-bar-on-iphone [https://perma.cc/UNG2-IACV].
138 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 51.
139 According to one report, Google's Mobile Application Distribution
Agreement requires the following from mobile phone manufacturers:
Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications
[listed elsewhere in the agreement] . . .are pre-installed on
the Device.
The phone manufacturer must "preload all Google
Applications approved in the applicable Territory ... on each
device."
The phone manufacturer must place "Google's Search and
the Android Market Client icon [Google Play] ... at least on
the panel immediately adjacent to the Default Home
Screen," with "all other Google Applications ... no more than
one level below the Phone Top."
The phone manufacturer must set "Google Search ... as the
default search provider for all Web search access points."
Google's Network Location Provider service must be
preloaded and the default. These provisions are confidential
and are not ordinarily available to the public. MADA
provision 6.1 prohibits a phone manufacturer from sharing
any Confidential Information (as defined), and Google labels
the MADA documents as "Confidential" which makes the
MADA subject to this restriction.
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engine is the default option and integrated with the operating
system, the battle for search may be the battle for the
dominant browser and operating system, especially on mobile
phones, where search is increasingly occurring. 140 This further
raises the entry barriers to the search market and the costs of
expanding in this market. 141
Status quo bias has important implications for search
quality and competition. The likelihood of anticompetitive
quality degradation increases when: (1) a search engine
controls the essential portals to search (including the mobile
operating system or Internet browser); (2) the search engine
controls and limits the portability of data so that users cannot
export their search and other personal data to rival engines
(thereby helping the search engine provide more relevant
results); and (3) the parties' applications are pre-installed on a
large base of mobile phones, tablets, or personal computers, so
that "status quo bias" affects consumers' choices.1 42
Although consumers can perceive differences in quality
between search engines when confronted with side-by-side
comparisons in blind tests, it is not altogether clear that
consumers, even with direct "Bing-it-on" quality challenges, act
upon quality differences in real life. If many consumers stick
with the default option, then rival search engines using Bing-
it-on and other such direct comparisons of quality will be
unable to overcome users' status quo bias. The search engine
that becomes the default option on most "entry points" for
search (such as the Internet browser) will attain the most users
and attract the most advertisers. This allows the dominant
search engine to intentionally degrade quality, by a small, but
significant amount, with minimal fear of backlash.
CONCLUSION
Quality is a fundamental aspect of competition and a key
non-price consideration in consumer decision-making. It seems
to follow that quality would be the prime variable affecting
usage of free goods, including search engines. The European
Commission in the Microsoft/Yahoo venture considered the
Benjamin Edelman, Secret Ties in Google's "Open" Android, BENJAMIN
EDELMAN (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.benedelman.org/news/021314-
1.html [https://perma.cc/V2G7-HJMC].
140 Joshua Barrie, People are Turning Away from Google Search, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2015), http://uk.businessinsider.com/google-search-
share-below-75-2015-2 [https://perma.ce/78XL-BGTE].
141 Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo!, at 111 (noting that entry
barriers "appear to be high").
142 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 7217-FacebookWhatsApp (Oct. 3,
2014) (C 7239) 24-25, at 134.
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joint venture's degradation of quality of Internet search results
as a theory of harm. 143 But the Commission assumed that
competition could prevent such degradation of quality.1 44
As we have shown, under several conditions a search
engine may have the incentive and ability to degrade the
quality of its search results to the detriment of consumers.
Quality degradation may be small, yet significant. If given the
option, consumers would prefer different, more relevant
results, which the search engine opts not to provide. Instead,
the search engine intentionally degrades the search quality to
earn greater profits or market power. The current state of
affairs allows for quality degradation despite competitive
pressure.
This leads us to the wider debate over defining a standard -
at what point does quality degradation violate competition laws
and merit intervention by authorities? One's view on
intervention depends on the extent to which the conduct falls
within the competition law, one's belief in the ability of
markets to correct themselves, and the likely remedies. Even if
one favors intervention, identifying the triggering point for
intervention and assessing the effectiveness of the remedies
may be challenging.14 5 The answer depends on several factors,
including the context. A merger between two search engines,
for example, may substantially lessen competition by enabling
a small, but significant, non-transitory degradation in search
quality. If the evidence strongly supports this theory, one
would expect competition authorities to enjoin the merger.
More problematic is if the degradation of quality is solely the
unilateral exercise of market power. A major player may
intentionally degrade the quality of its search results by a
small, but significant, amount. Suppose its quality, due to
network effects, is still superior to rivals. Should competition
policy condemn such relative degradation? If so, how does one
identify the optimal point of intervention?
However, if a company systematically degrades the quality
of its search results to attain or maintain a monopoly, it seems
143 Eur. Comm'n Case No. COMP/M. 5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! (Feb. 18, 2010)
(C 1077), at 202-04. The Commission in that case left open whether
Internet search constituted a separate market. Id. 85-86.
144 Amelio & Magos, supra note 18, at 52 ("In summary, the literature
suggests that an important role for competition is to induce search
engines to provide more relevance.").
145 Understanding why rival search engines do not prevent quality
degradation may also help competition authorities with designing
remedies. Competition authorities might consider, for example, how
search and user data portability might level the playing field, and the
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likely that authorities would intervene. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeated, "In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the [competition law] does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 146
Situations in which a company seeks to consolidate a monopoly
merit state intervention, especially where the quality
degradation is part of the search engine's plan to leverage its
dominance into other markets, thereby causing even greater
consumer harm. 147
Although remedies are outside the scope of our article, our
analytical framework can offer some insight. If the misaligned
incentives involve the platform favoring its own vertical
services, then the competition authority can consider structural
remedies, such as requiring the platform to spin off its search
engine. Behavioral remedies, including forbidding the search
engine from biasing its search results in favor of its own
vertical services, could also be effective. This way, the
algorithm would identify the most relevant results as if all the
sites were independent. If instead the learning-by-doing
network effect enables quality degradation, the competition
authority can consider the feasibility of data portability
remedies. Mechanisms that foster status quo bias, such as
long-term agreements granting a search engine default status
and the bundling of search engines with operating systems,
warrant scrutiny when used by a dominant firm. The European
Commission has expressed concerns that Google's Android,
among other things, requires "smartphone and tablet
manufacturers to exclusively pre-install Google's own
applications or services, in particular Google's search
engine." 148
Ultimately, the European Commission's Statement of
Objections in the Google case opens the door to wider
146 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (quoting
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)); see also United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721-723 (1944); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945).
147 We discuss some abuses by dominant online platforms in our submission
to the U.K. House of Lords, Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single
Market (Oct. 16, 2015), http ://ssrn.com/abstract=2677267 and
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2677267 [https://perma.cc/2MJU-WK9K].
148 European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on
Antitrust Decisions Concerning Google, supra note 17. The Commission
will also investigate "the alleged bundling together of certain Google
products with other apps and services" and "if Google is hindering the
ability of manufacturers of smartphones or tablets, who want to use the
Android operating system, from being able to use and develop other
open-source versions of Android (so-called 'Android forks')." Id.
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considerations of consumer welfare and quality. The case
signals the growing importance of quality competition as
consumers are increasingly offered free goods and services in
exchange for their personal data and exposure to behavioral
ads. There will undoubtedly be other cases involving
intentional quality degradation along various dimensions,
including privacy protection. Some firms will argue that
competitive pressure curbs or prevents the intentional
degradation of quality. This piece reveals the contrary, that
search engines can and do degrade quality, even when
competition is a click away.
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